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There is a sharp separation between the scholarly literature of originalists
and that of professional historians. Originalists cite one another, but regularly ignore recent work by historians, whom they accuse of misunderstanding their goals and methods.1 Historians are generally happy to

1. Originalists often cite a handful of works of history, most importantly Gordon S. Wood,
The Creation of the American Republic, 1776–1787 (Chapel Hill: University of North
Carolina Press, 1969). But Creation is 50 years old, and citations to recent work are
scant. There are only a handful of citations to winners of the John Philip Reid Award, including Daniel J. Hulsebosch, Constituting Empire: New York and the Transformation of
Constitutionalism in the Atlantic World, 1664–1830 (Chapel Hill: University of North
Carolina Press, 2005); Christopher Tomlins, Freedom Bound: Law, Labor and Civic
Identity in Colonizing English America, 1580–1865 (New York: Cambridge University
Press, 2010); and Max M. Edling, A Hercules in the Cradle: War, Money, and the
American State, 1783–1867 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2014).
Little-Griswold winners fare little better. Mary Sarah Bilder, The Transatlantic
Constitution: Colonial Legal Culture and the Empire (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 2004) has been cited less than a half dozen times in law review articles
advancing originalist arguments. Mary Sarah Bilder’s Beveridge Prize winning Madison’s
Hand: Revising the Constitutional Convention (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press, 2015) has been lauded as a work of history by originalists, but largely discounted
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return the favor.2 Engagement between the two communities is too often
limited to methodological disputes and amicus briefs.3 As a result, historical inquiry offers less to constitutional law than it might, and constitutional lawyers offer less to history than they could. Some of this
separation is due to unavoidable methodological tension: originalism
seeks to use the past to resolve current legal disputes, while history’s
foundational commitment is to the difference between the past and the present.4 But those methodological tensions—important as they are—have not
always frustrated productive dialogue.
Originalism, in fact, emerged as an important theory of constitutional
interpretation in the 1970s because of developments in professional historiography. New, post-revisionist approaches to the historiography of
Reconstruction inspired and legitimated the book that set originalism on
its current trajectory: Raoul Berger’s Government by Judiciary.5 The revolution in the historiography of the founding embodied in Gordon Wood’s
Creation of the American Republic offered originalists other opportunities.6 It was not unbridgeable methodological disagreements, but technological, institutional, and disciplinary developments that separated history
from originalism: the digitization of historical records, the growing inﬂuence social and cultural history, the shift to “original public meaning originalism,” and, most importantly, the emergence of an inﬂuential network of
originalist scholars, judges, and institutions. Those trends have only accelerated in the twenty-ﬁrst century, which makes a return to the close but
contentious relationship of the 1970s unlikely. Nevertheless, the role that
historians played in creating originalism suggests that opportunities for
productive dialogue still exist, even if that dialogue will look different
than it did 40 years ago.

as being of little relevance. Lawrence B. Solum, “Triangulating Public Meaning: Corpus
Linguistics, Immersion, and the Constitutional Record,” BYU Law Review 2017 (2017):
1621–82, at 1656–57. Lawrence B. Solum, “Intellectual History as Constitutional
Theory,” Virginia Law Review 101 (2015): 1111–64, argues the methods of intellectual history are of limited use for originalists.
2. Saul Cornell, “Meaning and Understanding in the History of Constitutional Ideas: The
Intellectual History Alternative to Originalism,” Fordham Law Review 82 (2013): 721–56.
3. Joshua Stein, “Historians before the Bench: Friends of the Court, Foes of Originalism,”
Yale Journal of Law and the Humanities 25 (2013): 359–89.
4. Allan Megill, Historical Knowledge, Historical Error: A Contemporary Guide to
Practice (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007).
5. Raoul Berger, Government by Judiciary: The Transformation of the Fourteenth
Amendment, 1st ed. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1977).
6. Wood, Creation.
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I.
Government by Judiciary did not invent originalism.7 Judges, academics,
and politicians supported the theory before 1977.8 But Berger’s originalist
criticism of the Warren Court’s Fourteenth Amendment decisions produced a decisive shift among conservative intellectuals and academics
toward the theory.9 It made originalism what it is today: a heavily contested
theory of unquestioned importance.
It succeeded for many reasons. It combined an ambitious defense of
originalism and a sharp critique of the Warren Court’s Fourteenth
Amendment jurisprudence. The debates in the 39th Congress, Berger
argued, conclusively demonstrated that the Fourteenth Amendment was
intended to protect no more than the limited rights to property, contract,
and court access that were identiﬁed in the 1866 Civil Rights Act. That
limited intention, which Berger argued was legally binding, contradicted
pivotal Warren Court precedents, including Griswold v. Connecticut’s
identiﬁcation of a right to privacy, Baker v. Carr’s protection of voting
rights, and Brown v. Board of Education.10 That critique of judicial activism resonated with conservative intellectuals and political actors.11 In addition, Berger himself was a prestigious scholar with a reputation for
scholarly independence and no associations with either the conservative
movement or segregation.12 And his arguments, although certainly not

7. Johnathan O’Neill, Originalism in American Law and Politics: A Constitutional
History (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2005).
8. Alfred Avins, “Anti-Miscegenation Laws and the Fourteenth Amendment: The
Original Intent,” Virginia Law Review 52 (1966): 1224–55; Robert Bork, “Neutral
Principles and Some First Amendment Problems,” Indiana Law Journal 47 (1971): 1–35;
Sam J. Ervin, “The Role of the Supreme Court as the Interpreter of the Constitution,”
Alabama Lawyer 26 (1965): 389–99; and William Rehnquist, “The Notion of a Living
Constitution,” University of Texas Law Review 54 (1976): 693–706.
9. Ken I. Kersh, “Ecumenicalism through Constitutionalism: The Discursive
Development of Constitutional Conservatism in National Review, 1955–1980,” Studies in
American Political Development 25 (2011): 86–116; and O’Neill, Originalism, 111–32.
10. Berger, Government by Judiciary, 1st ed.
11. Keith E. Whittington, “The New Originalism,” Georgetown Journal of Law and
Public Policy 2 (2004): 599; Kersh, “Ecumenicalism”; and O’Neill, Originalism, 111–32.
12. O’Neill, Originalism, 111–32. Compare with Sam Ervin Jr. and Alfred Avins who
opposed Brown and the 1964 Civil Rights Act on originalist grounds. Alfred Avins,
“Racial Segregation in Public Accommodation,” Case Western Reserve Law Review 18
(1967): 1251–83; Alfred Avins, “De Facto and de Jure School Segregation,” Mississippi
Law Journal 32 (March 1967): 179–247; and Sam J. Ervin, “The United States Congress
and Civil Rights Legislation,” North Carolina Law Review 42 (1963): 3–15.
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convincing to everyone, were clear, carefully documented, and exhaustively defended.13
But Berger also owed some of his success to a revolution in Reconstruction
historiography that inspired his efforts and legitimated his conclusions.
Earlier claims that the Warren Court’s Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence
was inconsistent with the intentions of its drafters was written into the teeth of
the historical revisionism of Kenneth Stamp, James McPherson, and others,
who routed the overt racism of the Dunning School and recast the Radical
Republicans in the 39th Congress as racial egalitarians who fought to establish a biracial democracy.14 The Radicals, they argued, failed in the short
term, but successfully constitutionalized their goals in the Fourteenth and
Fifteenth Amendments.15 Jacobus TenBroek and Howard Jay Graham
applied that political history to the Fourteenth Amendment itself, which
they saw as an expression of abolitionist-inspired racial egalitarianism.16
Berger’s work, in contrast, extended the post-revisionism of David Donald,
Michael Les Benedict, Harold Hyman, and others.17 Those scholars also
rejected the Dunning School, but emphasized the political power and limited
aspirations of moderate Republicans. Racism and fears of centralized authority among moderates, post-revisionists argued, led the 39th Congress to preserve signiﬁcant parts of the pre-Civil War federal system. Government by
Judiciary explicitly built on that research, which Berger followed closely.18
13. Berger, Government by Judiciary, 2nd ed. (Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund, 1997),
485–91.
14. Avins, “De Facto and de Jure School Segregation”; Avins, “Anti-Miscegenation Laws
and the Fourteenth Amendment: The Original Intent”; and L. Brent Bozell, The Warren
Revolution: Reﬂections on the Consensus Society (New Rochelle, NY: Arlington House, 1966).
15. Hans L. Trefousse, The Radical Republicans; Lincoln’s Vanguard for Racial Justice
(New York: Knopf, 1968); LaWanda and John H. Cox, “Negro Suffrage and Republican
Politics: The Problem of Motivation in Reconstruction Historiography,” Journal of
Southern History 33 (August 1967): 303–30; Willie Lee Rose, Rehearsal for
Reconstruction: The Port Royal Experiment (Indianapolis, IN: Bobbs-Merrill, 1964);
James M. McPherson, The Struggle for Equality: Abolitionists and the Negro in the Civil
War and Reconstruction (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1964); and Kenneth
M. Stampp, The Era of Reconstruction, 1865–1877 (New York: Knopf, 1965).
16. Howard Jay Graham, Everyman’s Constitution (Madison: State Historical Society of
Wisconsin, 1968); and Jacobus TenBroek, Equal under Law (New York: Collier Books, 1965).
17. Michael Les Benedict, A Compromise of Principle: Congressional Republicans and
Reconstruction, 1863–1869 (New York: W.W. Norton, 1974); David Herbert Donald, The
Politics of Reconstruction, 1863–1867 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press,
1965); Harold Melvin Hyman, A More Perfect Union: The Impact of the Civil War and
Reconstruction on the Constitution (New York: Knopf, 1973); and Phillip S. Paludan, A
Covenant with Death: The Constitution, Law, and Equality in the Civil War Era (Urbana:
University of Illinois Press, 1975).
18. Berger, Government by Judiciary, 1st ed., 5.
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Berger wrote to Michael Les Benedict to praise him for demonstrating that it
was the “the conservatives and centrists, not the radicals, [who] wrote the
[Fourteenth Amendment’s] script,”19 and he wrote Harold Hyman to request
comments on his draft. “My study,” Berger explained, “conﬁrmed the revisionist historians, including your own work.”20 The problem, he continued,
was that “lawyers have not come to grips with the impact of revisionist studies on construction of the 14th.”21 Section one made historical arguments that
were a springboard for his legal analysis in part two, but, he told Hyman, it
“can stand alone, and perhaps it should, uncontaminated by the controversy
about the techniques of the Warren court.”22
Berger’s engagement with post-revisionism did not immunize him from
sharp criticism from historians both in public and in private.23 It nevertheless helped legitimate his claims. “I was seduced,” wrote Hyman in
response to the draft. “[Y]ou have written an immensely important reconsideration. It will reopen argument and on a higher level than ever.
Therefore historians will thank you.”24 Willard Hurst wrote to tell
Berger that he was a reader for the press. He had some stylistic and organizational complaints, but found no “major disagreements of substance.”25
Later, he wrote Berger about the ferocious debate that Government by
Judiciary had spawned in the law reviews: “you conﬁrm again that critics
of your historical analysis are not critics of your history—certainly they
don’t succeed where they try—but are in pursuit of certain substantive public policy goals which they like.”26 Post-revisionists may not have intended
it, but they helped spark a revolution in constitutional interpretation.
A new interpretation of the founding, grounded in intellectual history
and epitomized by Gordon Wood’s Creation of the American Republic,

19. Berger to Michael Les Benedict,” September 21, 1975, Box 1, Folder 5, Raoul Berger
Papers, Harvard Law School Special Collections [hereafter Berger Papers].
20. Berger to Harold Hyman, February 2, 1976, Box 1, Folder 20, Berger Papers.
21. Ibid.
22. Ibid.
23. Stanley I. Kutler, “Raoul Berger’s Fourteenth Amendment: A History or Ahistorical?”
Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly 6 (1979): 511–26; and Avaim Soifer, “Protecting
Civil Rights: A Critique of Berger’s History,” New York University Law Review 54
(1979): 651–706. In his notes on the manuscript of Government by Judiciary, Hyman
told Berger that, “I want my JD students, who are working for history MAs and PhD’s,
to grapple with far more kinds of evidence than” you have examined. Hyman to Berger,
March 3, 1976, Box 1, Folder 20, Berger Papers.
24. Hyman to Berger, March 3, 1976, Box 1, Folder 20, Berger Papers.
25. Willard Hurst to Berger, December 21, 1976, Box 1, Folder 19, Berger Papers.
26. Hurst to Berger, October 5, 1981, Box 1, Folder 19, Berger Papers.
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also made originalism more attractive.27 Wood’s argument that the ﬁght
over the Constitution replaced the classical politics of virtue with a recognizably modern system of political thought was deeply historicist. It was
thus in tension with aspects of consensus and progressive historiography,
and directly at odds with anti-historicist perspectives like those of
Straussian political philosophers.28 But Wood’s argument could be
interpreted to associate the Constitution’s ultimate form with a broadly
shared, coherent, and recognizably modern political theory.29 When that
interpretation was combined with his emphasis on the causal power of
ideas—“Ideology creates behavior,” he later wrote—his work could be
understood, or perhaps caricatured, to establish that the Constitution was
the product of a limited set of consensus political principles that continued
to have relevance in contemporary political debates. That understanding
made originalism more attractive in multiple ways.30
Wood’s emphasis on the causal power of broadly shared ideas made
research easier, by suggesting that the Constitution’s meaning could be
captured by attention to public debates.31 Law professors largely lacked
the support, training, and interest to do the archival research needed to ferret out how economic interests shaped the response of various factions to
the Constitution. They were, however, accustomed to searching legislative
history for indications of a statute’s meaning, and were happy to apply that
approach to the Constitution. Hyman, for example, complained that
Government by Judiciary relied too much on public justiﬁcations for the
Fourteenth Amendment. You should, he wrote to Berger, “grapple with
far more kinds of evidence than the pari materia rule. The politics of the
DC bill and the 14th am[endment] bill were not the same.”32 Berger
was unmoved: “there is a large body of law about interpretation. For
40 years this was my bread and meat. What I say will carry weight with
courts, not the items you mentioned.”33 “Of course we must read the
27. Wood, Creation. Wood’s approach, of course, was not unique. Bernard Bailyn, The
Ideological Origins of the American Revolution (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,
1967); and J. G. A. Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and
the Atlantic Republican Tradition (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1975).
28. Gordon S. Wood, “The Fundamentalists and the Constitution,” The New York Review
of Books 35 (1988): 33–40.
29. Edward Countryman, “Of Republicanism, Capitalism, and the ‘American Mind,’” The
William and Mary Quarterly 44 (1987): 556–62.
30. “Ideology,” he wrote later, “creates behavior.” Gordon S. Wood, “Ideology and the
Origins of Liberal America,” The William and Mary Quarterly 44 (July 1987): 628–40, at
631.
31. Countryman, “Of Republicanism, Capitalism, and the ‘American Mind.’”
32. Hyman to Berger, March 3, 1976, Box 1, Folder 20, Berger Papers.
33. Berger to Hyman, April 6, 1976, Box 1, Folder 20, Berger Papers.
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[members of the 39th Congress] in their frame of reference,” he wrote later.
“But . . . for courts it is what is said on the ﬂoor during the debates that is
controlling.”34
The ideological interpretation’s emphasis on the emergence of recognizably modern political principles during the debate over the Constitution
thus simpliﬁed the application of Founding Era debates to contemporary
constitutional issues. To view the Constitution as the product of recognizably modern ideas of liberty, democracy, and republicanism could ease,
even if unintentionally, an ascent to levels of abstraction that avoided the
deeply contextual and sometimes unappealing role of the practical politics,
economic interest, and sectional advantage.35 It allowed the Constitution to
be seen as the product of timeless political principles identiﬁed and applied
by a remarkably wise group of dedicated public servants. From that perspective, the Founders were asking much the same constitutional questions
as contemporary Americans, and answering them with remarkable wisdom.
Exemplary of how originalists embraced this perspective is Michael
McConnell’s 1987 review of Raoul Berger’s next book, Federalism: the
Founders Design. The review, which cited Creation twice, criticized
Berger’s failure to recognize that the Constitution “inspires reverence not
just because it was drafted and ratiﬁed by our forefathers, who were an
uncommonly clever lot, but because it is the most successful attempt in history to construct a polity consistent with both the baser passions and higher
aspirations of its citizens.”36 More concretely, McConnell argued that
Berger failed to recognize that the Founders had designed an effective
federal system by anticipating the insights of contemporary public choice
theorists such as James Buchanan.37 Berger’s book thus failed in what
McConnell saw as its chief task: to offer to contemporary proponents of
national power the same arguments for federalism that had won the day
at the founding.38
Like post-revisionism, the ideological interpretation of the founding was
not intended as a support for originalism. Indeed, some of its leading advocates are also some of originalism’s most effective critics, and even Wood
34. Ibid.
35. Jack N. Rakove, “Gordon S. Wood, the ‘Republican Synthesis,’ and the Path Not
Taken,” The William and Mary Quarterly 44 (1987): 617–22. Michael J. Klarman, The
Framer’s Coup: The Making of the United States Constitution (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2016), has recently re-emphasized those themes.
36. Michael W. McConnell, “Federalism: Evaluating the Founders’ Design (reviewing
Federalism: The Founders’ Design by Raoul Berger),” University of Chicago Law
Review 54 (1987): 1486.
37. Ibid., 1491–93, 1508, 1510.
38. Ibid., 1491–93, 1511.
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himself has rejected the theory.39 And like post-revisionism, it was certainly not the only trend that helped legitimate originalism.40 But together
with post-revisionism, it made originalism more attractive to originalist
scholars such as Raoul Berger and Michael McConnell, whose careers
demonstrate a simultaneous commitment to shaping the application of judicial review and participating in scholarly debate at the highest level.
II.
When Gordon Wood complained in 2006 that, “[i]f it weren’t for the law
professors who teach and write constitutional history we wouldn’t have
much constitutional history being written or taught in the academy these
days,”41 and then blamed that problem on history faculties who “prefer
popular cultural history to what some dead white males in the past did
with the Constitution,” he undoubtedly surprised some historians, particularly those who believed that cultural history could enrich our understanding of the Constitution.42 But his criticism suggests an important reason
that the relationship between history and originalism deteriorated: originalists, who were shifting their attention from original intentions to original
public meaning, found little value in the products of social and cultural
history.
By the late 1980s, most historians had concluded that Wood’s approach
had underestimated the complexity, conﬂict, and contingency present in
the Founding Era. A colloquium on Creation testiﬁed to the book’s enduring importance, but also demonstrated historians’ growing emphasis on a
39. Jack N. Rakove, Original Meanings: Politics and Ideas in the Making of the
Constitution (New York: A.A. Knopf, 1996); Jonathan Gienapp, “Historicism and
Holism: Failures of Originalist Translation,” Fordham Law Review 84 (2015): 935–56.
“We do not, and cannot, base our constitutional jurisprudence on the historical reality of
the Founding,” said Wood in Gordon S. Wood and Scott D. Gerber, “The Supreme Court
and the Uses of History,” Ohio Northern Law Review 39 (2013): 448.
40. Other important developments are examined in Whittington, “The New Originalism,”
and G. Edward White, “The Arrival of History in Constitutional Law Scholarship,” Virginia
Law Review 86 (2002): 485–633.
41. Gordon Wood, “How Democratic is the Constitution?” New York Review of Books 53
(2006): 25–27. Work published within 5 years of Wood’s comment include Max M. Edling,
A Revolution in Favor of Government: Origins of the U.S. Constitution and the Making of
the American State (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003); John Ferling, A Leap in the
Dark: The Struggle to Create the American Republic (New York: Oxford University
Press, 2003); and Woody Holton, “Did Democracy Cause the Recession That Led to the
Constitution?” Journal of American History 92 (2005): 442–69.
42. Ruth H. Bloch, “The Constitution and Culture,” The William and Mary Quarterly 44
(1987): 550–55.
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kaleidoscopic variety of ideologies and interests that clearly differed from
those of modern America. There was broad agreement that Wood had overemphasized the causal role of Republicanism.43 He was criticized for
ignoring other Founding Era ideologies,44 underestimating the role of religion, political economy, and economic interest,45 and ignoring the contributions of women, African Americans, and non-elites.46 Elsewhere,
neo-Progressive scholars re-emphasized the importance of class conﬂict,47
Peter Onuf recaptured the role of sectional self-interest,48 and Saul Cornell
demonstrated that the anti-Federalists were much more than the representatives of ideas that lost.49 The politics and economics of slavery had
become more important, too.50 Wood had addressed some of these themes,
and supported exploration of others,51 but the new emphasis on complexity, conﬂict, and social and economic interest was clear, and, as Jack
Rakove’s Original Meanings noted, it made recovery of a binding original
intention difﬁcult.52
A similar shift to contingency, conﬂict, and complexity in the historiography of Reconstruction further divided originalists and historians. Eric
Foner’s Reconstruction: America’s Unﬁnished Revolution, still the standard work, moved past the post-revisionist concern with politics and the
limits of reconstruction to integrate social and economic history. It
re-established the importance of class conﬂict and the agency of the new
freedmen and emphasized that Radical Republicans only abandoned their
43. Jackson Turner Main, “An Agenda for Research on the Origins and Nature of the
Constitution of 1787–1788,” The William and Mary Quarterly 44 (1987): 591–96; and
Rakove, “Gordon S. Wood, the ‘Republican Synthesis,’ and the Path Not Taken.”
44. Bloch, “The Constitution and Culture”; Countryman, “Of Republicanism, Capitalism,
and the ‘American Mind’”; and John Patrick Diggins, “Between Bailyn and Beard: The
Perspectives of Gordon S. Wood,” The William and Mary Quarterly 44 (1987): 563–68.
45. John Howe, “Gordon S. Wood and the Analysis of Political Culture in the American
Revolutionary Era,” The William and Mary Quarterly 44 (1987): 569–75.
46. Gary B. Nash, “Also there at the Creation: Going beyond Gordon S. Wood,” The
William and Mary Quarterly 44 (1987): 602–11.
47. Ferling, A Leap in the Dark; and Woody Holton, Unruly Americans and the Origins
of the Constitution (New York: Hill and Wang, 2007).
48. Peter S. Onuf, The Origins of the Federal Republic: Jurisdictional Controversies in
the United States, 1775–1787 (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1983).
49. Saul Cornell, The Other Founders: Anti-Federalism and the Dissenting Tradition in
America, 1788–1828 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1999).
50. Paul Finkelman, Slavery and the Founders: Race and Liberty in the Age of Jefferson
(Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1996); Carroll Smith-Rosenberg, “Dis-Covering the Subject of
the ‘Great Constitutional Discussion,’ 1786–1789,” The Journal of American History 79
(1992): 841–73; and Gary B. Nash, Race and Revolution (Madison: Madison House, 1990).
51. Wood, “Ideology and the Origins of Liberal America.”
52. Rakove, Original Meanings.
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efforts to establish a biracial democracy as Reconstruction proceeded.53
Amy Dru Stanley’s tracing of the contingencies, contradictions, and conﬂict in the meaning of liberty that unfolded throughout Reconstruction suggest how hard it is to identify a shared understanding of the liberty that the
Fourteenth Amendment was intended to protect.54
As the work of Foner, Stanley, and others indicate, historians of
Reconstruction and the founding increasingly doubted that words and
the ideas they expressed were neutral mediums for the transmission of
coherent and static concepts. Many concluded that words were not just
the tools through which problems were identiﬁed and resolved. Instead,
their meaning changed in response to intentional manipulation by political
actors. Words were therefore not just tools to identify and resolve political
conﬂicts, they were also in large measure deﬁned by the outcome of political conﬂict. This understanding was not new in the 1980s. Indeed, it was
at the core of Wood’s Creation.55 But it was becoming important among
historians just as originalists made an opposite turn in their understanding
of language.56
The largest change in originalism since the 1970s was a shift in emphasis from the original intentions of the Constitution’s drafters to the original
public meaning of the Constitution’s text.57 Most advocates of this “New
Originalism” concluded that because the American people ratiﬁed only the
public meaning of the Constitution, it was only that meaning that had
enough democratic legitimacy to justify judicial enforcement.58 That new
focus directed originalist research away from issues to which historians’
expertise was most clearly applicable—the actual motivations and expectations of the Constitution’s drafters—to the broadly accepted meaning of

53. Eric Foner, Reconstruction: America’s Unﬁnished Revolution, 1863–1877
(New York: Harper & Row, 1988).
54. Amy Dru Stanley, From Bondage to Contract: Wage Labor, Marriage, and the
Market in the Age of Slave Emancipation (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998).
55. Wood, Creation; and Quentin Skinner, “Some Problems in the Analysis of Political
Thought and Action,” Political Theory 2 (1974): 277–303.
56. Terence Ball and J.G.A. Pocock, eds., Conceptual Change and the Constitution
(Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1988); Gienapp, “Historicism and Holism”; and
John E. Toews, “Intellectual History after the Linguistic Turn: The Autonomy of
Meaning and the Irreducibility of Experience,” American Historical Review 92 (1987):
879–907.
57. Lawrence B. Solum, “Originalism and Constitutional Construction,” Fordham Law
Review 82 (2013): 453–538; Keith Whittington, Constitutional Interpretation (Lawrence:
University Press of Kansas, 2001); and Randy Barnett, Restoring the Lost Constitution
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2003).
58. Whittington, “The New Originalism.”
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constitutional provisions.59 The need to justify this shift to originalism’s
critics as well as “original intent originalists” led “New Originalists” further away from historians, as they increasingly sought support for their
claims in the philosophy of language.60 Thus Randy Barnett’s claim that
New Originalism “can be very disappointing for critics of originalism—
and especially for historians [who] expect to see a richly detailed legislative history only to ﬁnd references to dictionaries, common contemporary
meanings, and logical inferences from the structure and general purposes
of the text.”61 It also helps explain the collective originalist shrug that
greeted Mary Bilder’s Bankcroft Prize-winning investigation of what
was once a primary source for the Constitution’s meaning: James
Madison’s notes from the Constitutional Convention.62
Technological and institutional changes have bolstered the effect of these
intradisciplinary developments. The publication of primary documents made
historical research much easier, but the digitization of sources of computer
analysis has given originalists the ability to bypass historians in their search
for original meaning.63 Visits to dusty archives are now unnecessary to ﬁnd
colonial newspapers or private correspondence; a mouse click will do.64 And
“big data” offers originalists new ways to construct original public meaning.65 BYU Law School has produced a full text searchable “Corpus of
Founding Era American English” that, as of this writing, contained just
under 120,000 texts written between 1760 and 1799.66
Perhaps most importantly, however, originalists can now legitimate their
interpretations of the past even in the face of opposition from historians. A
conservative legal network only in its infancy when Berger wrote
Government by Judiciary is now a staunch advocate of originalism and a
powerful force in American law, politics, and academic life.67 Originalist
59. Gienapp, “Historicism and Holism.”
60. Lawrence B. Solum, “Originalist Methodology,” University of Chicago Law Review
84 (2017): 269–95.
61. Randy E. Barnett, “An Originalism for Nonoriginalists,” Loyola Law Review 45
(1999): 621–54.
62. Bilder, Madison’s Hand; and Solum, “Triangulating Public Meaning,” 1656.
63. Herbert J. Storing, ed., The Complete Anti-Federalist (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1981).
64. National Historical Publications & Records Commission, Founders Online. https://
founders.archives.gov/ (May 9, 2019).
65. James C. Phillips, Daniel M. Ortner, and Thomas R. Lee, “Corpus Linguistics &
Original Public Meaning: A New Tool to Make Originalism More Empirical,” Yale Law
Journal Forum 126 (2016).
66. BYU Law, Law and Corpus Linguistics. https://lawcorpus.byu.edu/ (May 9, 2019).
67. Steven M. Teles, The Rise of the Conservative Legal Movement: The Battle for
Control of the Law (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008).
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arguments are produced at some of academia’s most prestigious institutions
and supported by a network of think tanks and other institutions.
Georgetown Law School’s Center for the Constitution offers a summer
“Boot Camp” on originalism for interested law students, which includes
a $2,000 stipend.68 The University of San Diego’s Center for the Study
of Constitutional Originalism hosts an annual conference on originalism.69
Stanford’s Center for Constitutional Law is training a new generation of
talented originalists such as Will Baude, Nathan Chapman, and Ilan
Wurman. Public interest law ﬁrms channel originalist arguments to courts
staffed with originalist law clerks and judges.70 The Supreme Court may
have a durable originalist majority. These networks provide more than
enough indicia of intellectual respectability to overcome the opposition
of historians, who can be dismissed as pursuing a different project.71

III.
Historians and originalists are much more divided than in the late 1970s,
when Raoul Berger could describe Government by Judiciary as an effort
to help lawyers “come to grips with the impact of [historians’] revisionist
studies.”72 And there are grounds for pessimism—even despair—about
whether that can change. Neither the technological nor the disciplinary
trends that contributed to this division are subsiding: big data, digitization
of sources, social history, and original meaning originalism will not depart
anytime soon. And the institutional reasons for the ongoing division may
be both more important and more durable. The success of the informal network of originalists centered on, but not restricted to, the Federalist
Society, means that today’s originalists—unlike Raoul Berger—need neither inspiration nor legitimation from historians. They provide it for themselves through a community of dedicated, talented, and inﬂuential
originalist scholars, judges, and think tanks that did not exist in the 1970s.
Nevertheless, there are some signs that an interdisciplinary dialogue
might move beyond methodological disputes and amicus briefs. The
68. Georgetown Law, Georgetown Center for the Constitution, Originalism Summer Seminar,
2019. https://www.law.georgetown.edu/constitution-center/originalism-summer-seminar/originalism-summer-seminar/ (May 9, 2019).
69. University of San Diego, School of Law, Center for the Study of Constitutional
Originalism, 2019. https://www.sandiego.edu/law/centers/csco/ (May 9, 2019).
70. Amanda Hollis-Brusky, Ideas with Consequences: The Federalist Society and the
Conservative Counterrevolution (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015).
71. Solum, “Intellectual History as Constitutional Theory.”
72. Berger to Hyman, February, 1976, Box 1, Folder 20, Berger Papers.
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increasingly sophisticated methodological debates between historians and
originalists have produced formidable arguments that even the search for
original public meaning can beneﬁt from the insights of historians, who
have immersed themselves in the broader culture that gives constitutional
language its meaning.73 Scholars and judges outside of the networks associated with the Federalist Society have begun to embrace forms of originalism, some tentatively, some enthusiastically.74 A growing number of
talented scholars with both JDs and PhDs are well positioned to participate
in interdisciplinary debates, and have increasingly done so.75 And a JD is
certainly not a prerequisite.76
Yet because today’s institutional context is so different from that of the
late 1970s, when Berger found inspiration and legitimation from postrevisionist historians, any meaningful substantive dialogue will have to
be nurtured, by both historians and originalists, in volumes such as this
one, in joint conferences, in readers’ reports, and in the kind of informal
interactions that Berger and Harold Hyman shared. And it should be.
Limiting engagement between history and originalism to theoretical disagreements and litigation will not resolve the contest between originalism
and other theories of constitutional interpretation. Originalism has been
subjected to decades of methodological criticism, yet there are more originalists than ever in important academic positions, think tanks, and courts.
If historians avoid substantive engagement with originalism, it will not
change the theory’s role in American law and politics. And if historians
are excluded from originalist debates, it will not improve our constitutional
law. It will only deprive an important theory of constitutional interpretation
of the insights of a historical profession whose remarkable expertise and
relevance to the originalist enterprise are clearly demonstrated in this
73. Gienapp, “Historicism and Holism”; G. Edward White, “Intellectual History and
Constitutional Decision Making,” Virginia Law Review 101 (2015): 1165–78.
74. Jack Balkin, Living Originalism (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2014);
and Bernadette Meyler, “Towards a Common Law Originalism,” Stanford Law Review 59
(2006): 551–600. At her conﬁrmation hearing, Elena Kagan said that “sometimes [the
Framers] laid down very speciﬁc rules. Sometimes they laid down broad principles.
Either way we apply what they say, what they meant to do. So in that sense, we are all originalists.” The Nomination of Elena Kagan to Be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court
of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, Part 1, 111th Cong. 62
(2010).
75. Two examples are Gregory Ablavsky, “‘With the Indian Tribes’: Race, Citizenship,
and Original Constitutional Meanings,” Stanford Law Review 70 (2018): 1025–76; and
Alison L. LaCroix, “The Interbellum Constitution: Federalism in the Long Founding
Moment,” Stanford Law Review 67 (2015): 397–446.
76. Saul Cornell “Originalism on Trial: The Use and Abuse of History in District of
Columbia v. Heller,” Ohio State Law Journal 69 (2008): 625–40.
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volume and elsewhere. The chances for a productive and substantive dialogue may appear limited today, but that dialogue is worth pursuing. And
we can pursue it with more hope when we recognize that the separation
between originalism and history has not always been so stark.
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